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Municipal Immunity in Police Torts
Carol F. Dakin*
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that
it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more re-
volting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished
long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the
past.1
U NFORTUNATELY, THE ABOVE QUOTATION illustrates the situation which
presently exists in the majority of jurisdictions, regarding mu-
nicipdl immunity from liability for torts committed by police officers.
This note will attempt to summarize and analyze this area of the law.
In general, a police officer is personally liable for the torts he com-
mits during the performance of his duty.2 The victim of the tort may
sue the officer civilly for punitive as well as consequential damages,3
if the jurisdiction permits such suits and exemplary awards. 4 Justifi-
cation for punitive damages is rooted in the deterrent effect they exert
upon the future conduct of the convicted and upon the behavior of all
individuals similarly inclined.-, Such awards are not a matter of right
as are compensatory damages, but are incidental to the cause of action.6
In addition to the civil action maintained by the victim, the state may
press criminal charges against the officer if it is felt that the violation
warrants such a measure.7
Any discussion of police tort liability hinges upon a desired balance
between the necessity of law enforcement and the preservation of in-
dividual rights and liberties. This balance is reflected by the limits
imposed upon an officer apprehending a suspect.8 Thus, where an officer
does exceed these limits while in the performance of his duty and in-
jures the suspect or an innocent third-party, the victim may sue him
* B.A., Mount Holyoke College; Fourth-year student at Cleveland-Marshall Law
School of Baldwin-Wallace College.
1 Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 469 (1897).
2 Downs v. Swann, 111 Md. 53, 73 A. 653 (1909). See also City of Miami v. Albro,
120 So.2d 23 (Fla. 1960).
3 Fisher v. City of Miami, 172 So.2d 455 (Fla. 1965).
4 See generally McCormick, Damages 278 (1935).
5 Fisher v. City of Miami, supra n. 3 at 457.
6 Sebastian v. Wood, 246 Iowa 94, 66 N.W.2d 841 (1954). See also Fisher v. City of
Miami, ibid.
7 Bonahoon v. State of Indiana, 203 Ind. 51, 178 N.E. 570 (1931). See also White v.
Towers, 37 Cal.2d 727, 235 P.2d 209 (1951); Noback' v. Town of Montclair, 33 N.J.
Super. 420, 110 A.2d 339 (1954).
8 Human v. Goodman, 159 Tenn. 241, 18 S.W.2d 381 (1929). See also Commonwealth
v. Duerr, 158 Pa. Super. 484, 45 A.2d 235 (1946); Holloway v. Moser, 193 N.C. 185,
136 S.E. 375 (1927).
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for damagesP Whether the cause of action is a viable one depends to a
large degree upon whether the act of the police officer was unlawful.
In Young v. Kelley,'0 the officer was found to be liable to a bystander
since he was not justified in shooting at his suspect who was only a mis-
demeanant. Negligence is also a factor in considering viability. In Davis
v. Hellwig," although justified in shooting at the suspect, the officer was
found liable to a bystander due to the circumstances in which the shoot-
ing occurred. The rules governing an assault and battery case in re-
spect to police officers are the same as those for private citizens, 1'
which vary slightly according to the jurisdiction.
Since the courts are in agreement that the police have no right
to assault a person needlessly and that the police are liable in the same
manner as an ordinary individual would be, one should give some con-
sideration to the remedies available to the tort victim. Despite the fact
that the victim is legally entitled to collect a judgment from the officer,
it is rare indeed when the officer is in a financial position to pay that
judgment. This situation leaves a victim who has suffered a decided
loss and a defendant who has not been subjected to the deterrent force
of court action since he cannot pay the judgment-a certainly inequitable
and deplorable condition.
There is one other aspect that should be noted before any
alternatives are considered. Occasionally the victim is not of such moral
character and financial position to press a claim against a police officer.13
In many cases the victim possesses a criminal record or was attempting
to commit a crime at the time the offense against him took place, items
which would decidedly influence the amount of a judgment awarded by
a jury, if not the judgment itself.14 However, this aspect does not in
any way alter the above condition, but merely serves to confuse the
issue in the mind of the public interested in a just solution.
The defects of imposing complete liability for tortious conduct are
readily apparent. It not only discourages persons from entering the
law enforcement field but also discourages persons in law enforcement
from performing their duties vigorously and fearlessly. It unjustly
penalizes police officers for performing their jobs--protecting the general
9 American Motorista Ins. Co. v. Rush, 88 N.H. 383, 190 A. 432 (1937). See also No-
back v. Town of Montclair, supra n. 7.
10 60 OhioApp. 382, 21 N.E.2d 602 (1938).
11 21 N.J. 412, 122 A.2d 497 (1956).
12 Downs v. Swann, supra n. 2 at 64.
13 Foote, Tort Remedies For Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 Minn. L. Rev.
493 (1955).
14 Such a plaintiff is found in City of Miami v. Bethel, 65 So.2d 34 (Fla. 1953), in
which Bethel admittedly was shooting craps in the backyard of a poolroom. Losing
all his money, he went into the poolroom. The police arrived and the remaining
crap shooters fled. Bethel was accosted and accused of the crime, which he denied.
He then was taken outside the poolroom and severely beaten by the police.
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public. As for the victim, this system gives him a meaningless remedy
since the officer is generally judgment-proof.
The most obvious answer to this situation, and one that has been
proposed by many legal scholars, 15 is that the municipality employing
the police officer be made liable for any injuries judged to be inflicted
unlawfully or negligently by the officer while performing his law en-
forcement duties. Edgar Fuller and A. James Casner recommend that
such municipal liability be limited to actual monetary damages suffered
and claim this procedure "would adequately and promptly compensate
the tort victim and would not remove incentives to non-tortious conduct
among officers... Persons victimized by the police officers' torts would
receive damages more in proportion to their real losses, and the un-
predictable results of emotionalized jury verdicts would be largely elimi-
nated." 16 Whether one agrees wholly with this proposal which would
eradicate jury trials from this area of the law, or partially with its theory
of shifting the monetary burden for compensation of the tort victim to the
municipality, one finds that the majority of jurisdictions in the United
States completely reject this theory.
These states adhere strictly to the doctrine of governmental im-
munity. The basis of this doctrine is traced by the various courts to
several authorities: the case of Russell v. Men of Devon,17 which held
that an unincorporated county was immune from suits because it had
no funds from which to pay judgments and because it would be better
for the victim to suffer an injury rather than impose vicarious liability
upon the people,1s the idea that "the King Can Do No Wrong;" 19 or in
one instance not to any court-originated doctrine but to the common
law. 20 However, there is a divergence from these views in a growing
minority of jurisdictions. Nine states have completely or partially dis-
avowed governmental immunity and held municipalities to be liable for
the torts of its police officers. A tenth state did abrogate the doctrine
only to have its legislature reinstate it.
Florida was the first state to declare such disavowal. In 1957, with
Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach,2 1 the Supreme Court of that state
15 See Foote, supra n. 11; Fuller and Casner, Municipal Tort Liability in Operation,
54 Harv. L. Rev. 437 (1941); Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Dam-
age Actions, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 209 (1963); Lawyer, Birth and Death of Government
Immunity, 15 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev. 529 (1966); Marcus and Jones, Toward a "Scope of
Official Duty" Immunity for Police Officers in Damage Actions, 53 Geo. L. J. 889
(1965); Tooke, The Extension of Municipal Liability in Tort, 19 Va. L. Rev. 97 (1932).
16 Fuller and Casner, supra n. 15 at 462.
17 2 Term Rept. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1788).
18 See Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So.2d 130 (Fla. 1957).
19 Kennedy v. City of Daytona Beach, 132 Fla. 675, 182 So. 228 (1938).
20 Maffei v. Incorporated Town of Kenmore, 80 Wyo. 33, 338 P.2d 808 (1959).
21 Supra n. 18.
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reversed its decisions of Kennedy v. City of Daytona Beach,2 2 and City
of Miami v. Bethel.2 3 The Kennedy case held that the police officer was
individually liable for damages and the municipality was not, due to the
theory of sovereign immunity. The Court at that time felt bound to ad-
here to precedents in the area and stated that any change in the law must
be enacted by the legislature. The Bethel case based its finding of gov-
ernmental immunity upon the theory that the police officers committed
an offense while exercising a governmental function-law enforcement.
Such functions are carried out in the interest of the general public
and accordingly, for policy reasons, have immunity from liability for
the torts of the officers involved. Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach 24
reversed these cases, holding "that when an individual suffers a direct,
personal injury proximately caused by the negligence of a municipal em-
ployee while acting within the scope of his employment, the injured indi-
vidual is entitled to redress from the municipality for the wrong done." 25
This case involved an action by a widow against the Town of Cocoa
Beach for the alleged negligent death of her husband who was jailed
while in a helpless state of intoxication and who died of smoke suffoca-
tion after being locked in an unattended jail. The court found the mu-
nicipality liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior. This land-
mark case imposing liability for negligent torts upon the municipality
was extended by subsequent decisions to include liability for intentional
torts. This extension was promulgated in Simpson v. City of Miami,26
in which it was held that the Hargrove decision placed no limitation
upon the nature of the tort and that the municipality was not immune
from liability for intentional torts committed by the police while per-
forming their law enforcement duties. City of Miami Beach v. Nye, 27
a case involving an assault and battery action, supported the Simpson
decision. The only qualification in Florida law concerning municipal
liability for police torts is found in Fisher v. City of Miami,2 s which
held that the tort victim could sue the municipality only for compen-
satory damages, not punitive damages. The reasoning behind this view
is that since the municipality did not commit the tort, the deterrent effect
of such action is not only useless but also unnecessarily expensive to
the taxpayers.
California in 1961 followed the example set by Florida. In Muskopf
v. Corning Hospital District,29 the Court abolished governmental im-
22 Supra n. 19.
23 Supra n. 14.
24 Supra n. 18.
25 Id. at 133.
26 155 So.2d 829 (Fla. 1963).
27 156 So.2d 205 (1963).
28 Supra n. 2.
29 11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 389 P.2d 457 (1961).
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munity for torts, stating that it was "an anachronism without rational
basis. . . [which] has existed by the force of inertia." 30 Justice Traynor
who wrote the decision observed that the rule of governmental immunity
has many exceptions which are illogical and unjust. This case illustrated
such a situation since the plaintiff had filed an action against the hospital
district, a state agency, for negligence in the treatment he had received
while a patient. If the hospital had not been connected with the state,
liability would have been clear, but since it was a state agency it would
have escaped from answering for its torts under previous cases. How-
ever, in the same year as the Muskopf decision the California legislature
passed moratorium legislation which held in abeyance until 1963 the op-
eration of abrogating governmental immunity. In 1963 the legislature
reinstated governmental immunity with certain exceptions that do not
affect the subject under discussion. 31 Unfortunately, this action is the
present law in that state.
It should be pointed out that in California, and the subsequent
states that will be discussed in this study, the cases that reverse earlier
decisions supporting governmental immunity are not those involving
police torts but rather injuries that have befallen school children or
hospital patients. These plaintiffs present a more inequitable case to
the court and arouse much public sympathy. However, the decisions
do abolish governmental immunity involving all employees including the
police.
In Illinois the doctrine of governmental immunity was overturned
by such a case. In Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No.
302,3 - an action was maintained on behalf of a school child who had
sustained injuries when the school bus in which he was riding left the
road due to the alleged negligence of its driver. The question as to
whether a city may he held liable directly for an assault committed by
one of its police officers in the scope of his employment was presented
in Peters v. Bellinger,33 and disposed of by adhering to the Molitor case
and finding the city liable.
Colorado abrogated the governmental immunity rule in Colorado
Racing Comm'n v. Brush Racing Ass'n,34 saying that the doctrine "may
be a proper study for discussion by students of mythology but finds
no haven or refuge in this Court." 35 This progressive attitude suffered
30 Id. at 92.
31 Cal. Govt. Code § 810.
32 18 Ill.2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959).
33 22 Ill.App.2d 105, 159 N.E.2d 528 (1959), reversed on grounds that cause of action
arose before the Molitor case, 19 Ill.2d 367, 166 N.E.2d 581 (1960).
34 136 Colo. 279, 316 P.2d 582 (1957).
35 Id. at 284.
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a reverse when a county was declared to possess such immunity in
Liber v. Flor,30 but it is still the law regarding police tort liability.
Arizona found that the doctrine of sovereign immunity was a
judicially-created creature which should be discarded and in Stone v.
Arizona Highway Com'n,3 7 followed the reasoning set out in Muskopf
v. Corning Hospital District.38 Wisconsin, as of 1962, also abolished gov-
ernmental immunity in Holytz v. City of Milwaukee.39 This case was
further supported by legislative action in which the only limitations
placed upon tort liability were: (1) the claim must be filed within 120
days after the event, (2) no punitive damages shall be awarded, and (3)
the amount received by the victim shall not exceed $25,000.40
While the above-mentioned states had to overturn precedents to
arrive at their decisions, Alaska announced that governmental immunity
had never been part of the law in that state, therefore, a municipality
was liable for the torts of its employees whether connected with either
a governmental or proprietary function.41
In New Jersey a distinction was drawn between acts of omission and
those of commission. In McAndrew v. Mularchuk,42 the Court held that
negligent acts of commission could render the municipality liable under
the doctrine of respondeat superior so that "complete immunity does not
exist." 43 This was an action for injuries sustained by a minor child
when he was struck by a bullet fired by a police officer who was at-
tempting to "scare him off." Therefore, in New Jersey a municipality
would be liable for the torts of assault and battery committed by police
officers, since these are definitely acts of "commission," while for in-
juries resulting from acts of "omission" the municipality would not be
rendered liable. This reasoning is not followed by any other state.
Several jurisdictions have prospectively overruled the doctrine of
governmental immunity. These are Michigan 44 and Minnesota 45 with
New York 46 appearing to be headed in that direction.
Among the remaining jurisdictions there is a divergence of views.
Some courts have stated that if there is to be any change in the law, it
36 143 Colo. 205, 353 P.2d 590 (1960).
37 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107 (1963).
38 Supra n. 29.
39 17 Wis.2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962).
40 Wis. Stat. Ann., vol. 40 K, § 895.43 (1966).
41 City of Fairbanks v. Schaible, 375 P2d 201 (Alaska 1962).
42 33 N.J. 172, 162 A.2d 820 (1960).
43 Id. at 181.
44 Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 111 N.W.2d 1 (1961).
45 Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist. No. 621, 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962).
46 Fields v. New York, 175 N.Y.S.2d 27, 151 N.E.2d 188 (1958); Schuster v. City of
New York, 180 N.Y.S.2d 265, 154 N.E.2d 534 (1958).
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must come from the legislature. 47 These holdings are in direct disagree-
ment with Stone v. Arizona Highway Commission,48 in which it was
ruled that the doctrine of governmental immunity was judicially created,
therefore, could be judicially abolished. Stare decisis does not and
should not preclude the courts from overturning a doctrine which is no
longer suited for modern society and which is working an injustice.
The courts should assume the responsibility to outlaw this archaic
doctrine. If, as in California, the legislature feels the rule should be
reinstated, they will pass the necessary laws. Courts in other jurisdic-
tions simply have stated that governmental immunity is the law of that
particular state.4 9 In Valdez v. City of Las Vegas,50 the Court went so
far as to state that in a complaint filed by a citizen against the city for
the tortious conduct of one of its police officers, it must be alleged that
the specific tortious act was committed by the officer under the direction
of the city.
In review, despite the existence of a strong minority, the climate
in the United States is not one in favor of the abrogation of the doc-
trine of governmental immunity in the near future. This is regrettable
since the doctrine "is essentially a relic from past centuries when gov-
ernment was in the hands of a few prominent, independent and sub-
stantial persons. ." 51 and . . . "is utterly unsuited to the twentieth-
century state. . 52 It should be hoped that in the states where the
legislatures have failed to act, the courts will see it as their duty to
overturn this anachronism, and that in the states where the courts have
refused to part with the past, the legislatures will enact laws to abolish
the doctrine. For, as Abraham Lincoln observed: "It is as much the duty
of government to render proper justice against itself, in favor of its
citizens, as to administer the same between private individuals." "I
Until such changes in the laws of the majority of the states are enacted,
police officers will be held personally liable for their torts, and their
employers will not.
47 Parker v. City of Hutchinson, 196 Kan. 148, 410 P.2d 347 (1966); Defender v. City
of McLaughlin, 228 F.Supp. 615 (N.D.S.D. 1964).
48 Supra n. 37.
49 Taylor v. City of Roswell, 48 N.M. 209, 147 P.2d 814 (1944); City of Nampa v.
Kibler, 62 Idaho 511, 113 P.2d 411 (1941).
50 68 N.M. 304, 361 P.2d 613 (1961).
51 Marcus and Jones, supra n. 15 at 896, quoting Robson, Report of the Committee on
Ministers' Powers, 3 Pol. Q. 346, 357-58 (1932).
52 Ibid.
53 Quoted in Swaya v. Tucson High School Dist. No. 1, 78 Ariz. 389, 391, 281 P.2d
105, 107 (1955).
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